Understand the world we live in?

[Christophe]

Yes because they are idiots...who have understood nothing about the laws of aerodynamics

Otherwise where did you find the 1000 hp?

https://gravity.co/

Yuck!



Tomorrow I'll try to calculate a return!

[GuyGadeboisTheBack]

Tomorrow I'll try to calculate a return!

No need, it's so crazy (1000 HP for 100 Kg in a pinch) that it's not worth a calculation... save yourself!

[Remundo]

these guys do the worst of the worst,

they combine hovering with small jet engines...

on the other hand, the specifications are to make the man fly with as little weight as possible.

This shit must be a bit dangerous though...

[GuyGadeboisTheBack]

Information. With the war in Ukraine, a leaden screed falls on the Russian media

It is difficult to work as a journalist in times of war. In Russia, certain media are “warned” or blocked by the federal control body and other victims of attacks by Anonymous hackers. The government claims, for its part, to create the only official site offering “reliable and verified information”.


On March 1, the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia requested “the limitation of access to information resources” of the Echo of Moscow radio and the Dozhd television channel, two respected and widely followed opposition media, reports the daily Nezavissimaïa Gazeta. The independent channel was already included in the register of “foreign agents”. Roskomnadzor, the federal media monitoring body, immediately blocked their websites.

According to the words used by the Prosecutor's Office, these media publish “systematically and for specific purposes” information “calling for extremist and violent actions against the citizens of Russia, attacks on public order and public security, participation in mass public events in contravention of the legislation and the forcible overthrow of the constitutional regime”.

In addition, underlines the federal body, “false data on Russia's special operation for the defense of the republics of Donetsk and Lugansk are disseminated on the Echo of Moscow and Dojd sites”.

Censorship
“We have not received any official warning yet,” declared Echo of Moscow editor-in-chief Alexei Venediktov, relayed by the Lenta.ru website. “We believe we have not committed any infraction.”

These accusations, supported by no example, no evidence, are purely gratuitous and insulting to journalists and citizens of Russia. We detect a political component, a measure of censorship prohibited by the Constitution, and we will challenge this measure.

Since the launch of Russia's military operation in Ukraine, Roskomnadzor has intervened on several occasions to block specific content such as for Taiga. info and TV2.today, or entire sites, like that of the student newspaper Doxa, continues Lenta.ru. On February 26, Novaya Gazeta and Mediazona were “warned” and “asked to remove certain content” for describing the Russian “special operation” as a “war”. After a survey of its readers, Novaya Gazeta decided to comply with the orders of the Russian regulator in order to save its site.

As early as February 24, Roskomnadzor had warned the media that they should only report on events in Ukraine from official Russian sources. Fines of up to 5 million rubles (40 euros) may be applied otherwise.

Anonymous enters the scene
Beyond the action of the Russian controller, certain media outlets suffered computer attacks claimed by Anonymous hackers, preventing any broadcast. The website of the major economic daily Kommersant was blocked for three days. The sites of Fontanka, Gazeta.ru and Izvestia were also targeted. On Wednesday March 2, at the beginning of the afternoon, the website of the widely circulated tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets was inaccessible.

The battle for information is also being played out on social networks. Thus, as Kommersant reports, Russia's governors began actively defending the Kremlin's policies on Western Internet platforms. However, their posts are increasingly blocked, particularly on Instagram. As a result, “Russian governors are moving to Pavel Durov’s Telegram messaging service”. An understandable attitude, say the experts, but “this service will probably not have the same effectiveness of communication with the population”.


1,4 million anti-Russian “fake news”
Faced with “the avalanche of fake news on the Russian segment of the Internet”, the Joint Commission on the Information Society, created in 2020 and responsible for combating what it designates as “false information”, s met on March 1, Kommersant informs. According to its report, 1,4 million pieces of information “related to anti-Russian propaganda” were disseminated on social networks. He also estimates the means used to carry out these attacks at around $1 billion.

For Ekaterina Mouzilina, director of the League for a Safe Internet – an association of Internet operators applying the Moscow line –, in addition to “false information”, hostile actions include “DDoS attacks, targeted advertising on networks, the use of bots for telephone calls to Russian citizens containing information aimed at frightening them about the killed soldiers”. For her, “the goal of such attacks is to generate panic among ordinary citizens, make them take to the streets and send them to ATMs to take out their money.”

To try to combat this situation, the government announced on March 1 the opening of a new official site, called “We explain.rf” (Obiasniaem.rf), which will operate on the model of the site created to provide information on the health situation in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Citizens will find “only verified and reliable information”.

Laurence Habay

https://www.courrierinternational.com/a ... ias-russes

[Christophe]

Tomorrow I'll try to calculate a return!

No need, it's so crazy (1000 HP for 100 Kg in a pinch) that it's not worth a calculation... save yourself!

You're right, they don't deserve it... but it tickles me... Just to prove how ridiculous it is!

Zapata does the same stupid things...and he is invited by Macron to July 14...

[Obamot]

Information.
With the war in Ukraine, a leaden screed falls on the Russian media

What is this propaganda doing here?

We see here again a splendid example of manipulation of “Self-proclaimed Ministry of Truth” who shows us HIS truth!

By deliberately and carefully omitting other truths….

IMG_1457.jpeg (299.9 KIO) Accessed 591 times

And the fact that in Russia this could possibly be understandable, given that it is at war. But ultimately there is no censorship of information, it is just no longer possible to spread “fake news” while against all Russian media in Europe, it is “queak” concession to broadcast withdrawn: HUGE!….But obviously, the sophisticated configuration of a brain like that of the author of the post no longer allows us to see the obvious. This too is a proven fact.

[fracass]

To calculate a return you would have to know the acceleration that the brothel is capable of inflicting on the man, right?

[Remundo]

while all our "mainstream Euroligarchs" continue to spread their lies to justify and prolong the war on the backs of the working classes, and soon taking the lives of their children (alas, which is already the case in Ukraine).

Huh The Hyena with Covidosecrets SMS?

[GuyGadeboisTheBack]

Testimony. “I took part in a Russia Today propaganda show”

The editorial director of the Italian daily “Domani” took part in a political program on Russian television on the war in Ukraine. He provides an edifying testimony on the strategies implemented by propaganda in Moscow.

“You are free to say whatever you want, but keep in mind that there are two soldiers who are ready to execute us if we say anything wrong.” Silence. “We’re joking, it’s Russian humor.”

This is how the recording of the Russia Today (RT) talk show – the Kremlin's propaganda arm – begins, where I was invited to talk about the war. I want to test the limits of this propaganda and understand its tricks.

It all started in a program by Otto e mezzo [“Eight and a Half”]. On this Italian talk show, I had found myself a few days earlier debating with Nadana Fridrikhson, a Russian journalist from RT and the Defense Ministry's radio station.

She denied the existence of any censorship in Russia and praised the virtues of free debate in this country engaged in a “special operation” in Ukraine which, she assured, could very well be described as a “war” on the air. without risking prison. Perfect, I wrote to him after the show, we'll see what it really is: if you invite me, I'll come on your show.

She agreed, and that's how I found myself on two different talk shows. The first on RT, the Russian channel which relays the Kremlin's world view in several languages ​​(it is mainly aimed at a foreign audience and was suspended by the European Commission after the invasion of Ukraine), and the second in a radio broadcast of the Russian Defense Ministry station.

“Do you know what happened on May 2, 2014? ”
The rules of engagement are a priori clear: no filter, I can say what I want. They ask the questions, I answer at my convenience.

Obviously, some precautions were taken on the Russian side and the RT broadcast was recorded. On the set, Georgy Babayan and Nadana Fridrikhson ask me questions in Russian, I have to answer them in Italian. An interpreter then provides translation in both directions (so I can't know what exactly is being said). After recording, you will have to wait almost a week before you can access the show on the Internet. On radio, the format is the same, except that it's live.

In the debate broadcast on RT, only the hosts ask the questions. It is an interrogation aimed, it seems, at demonstrating that those who condemn Putin's aggression in the West are simply misinformed. “Do you know what happened on May 2, 2014?” I am asked at the outset. This is a reference to the clashes in Odessa, which caused the death of 48 people. One of the most tragic events in the tensions that followed the Maidan Square movement, namely the uprising against the Russophile government of Viktor Yanukovych.

According to the UN, which traced the facts, violence was committed on both sides, Russophile and anti-Russian, and it is difficult to say who is more responsible than the other. UN observers assume that it was Russophiles who threw the Molotov cocktails that caused the tragedy. But the Ukrainian authorities having carried out very superficial investigations which did not make it possible to determine the culprits, the Odessa clashes became, in Russophile propaganda, the symbol of Ukrainian violence.

On this occasion, and on others, I will ask this question to my interlocutors during the program: “Even if this violence were perpetrated against the Russians, as you say, how does that authorize- Is the Russian army committing similar crimes today in Ukraine?” No response, but at least they let me talk.

And then there is the obsession with the Azov Battalion. Russian journalists do not try to defend the actions of their army on Ukrainian soil and will not even allude to operations on the ground, all the propaganda tends to demonstrate that the Ukrainians were looking for it and that the country must be effectively denazified. That is why journalists list the long list of crimes of Azov nationalists, who have swastikas tattooed on their bodies, etc. And since they were integrated into the regular Ukrainian army, the West is also supplying weapons to the Nazis, it is claimed here.

"What does it mean ? Are you going to kill them all?”
These accusations targeting Ukrainian nationalists, all assimilated to Nazis, are central in the Russian discourse because they allow RT journalists to defend the only argument in support of this “special military operation” which is not happening. as good as expected.

After the intervention of the Russian army, journalists explained that “there will be no more Nazis in Ukraine”. Knowing that, according to their criteria, anyone who does not side with Putin is suspected of Nazism, I ask: “What does that mean? That you’re going to kill them all?”

They speak in Russian, the interpreter does not translate, then they answer me: “Good question.” And explain: “We are opening humanitarian corridors, including for the Nazis of Azov, they have our safe passage. For now, this offer remains valid and we have no intention of killing them all.” For the moment.

Mussolini and Poroshenko
“You’ve heard of Stepan Bandera, right?” Bandera is a key word: anyone who cites him is obviously following the Putinian propaganda roadmap. This is not a current issue, since Bandera died in 1959. He was a nationalist, anti-Russian, anti-Semitic fighter, accomplice of the Nazis. “Did you know they recently named streets after him in Ukraine?”

No, I didn't know that, but toponymy does not seem very valid to me, as an argument, to justify the intervention of Russian tanks in the Donbass. “What if, in Italy, they named a street after Benito Mussolini? Do you have one in Rome?” Even they know that this is not the case, but I explain that there are still entire neighborhoods built under the fascists and that we can find them beautiful despite everything. And no one should think about committing carnage.

“And do you know the Alley of the Angels in Donetsk? In tribute to the victims of the [Ukrainian] Nazis? And did you know that former President Petro Poroshenko said that little Ukrainians should go to school and little Russians should go to cellars?” It continues like this for a little while.

The Minsk agreements in the viewfinder
Then the interrogation – on television and radio – focuses on the Minsk agreements of 2015. There, the Russian discourse is more subtle. Russia, according to Kremlin propaganda, is only a guarantor of this diplomatic agreement, and not one of the parties to the conflict. Moscow, like Berlin and Paris, has requested the establishment of a truce in the Donbass, and any violation of the ceasefire is therefore solely attributable to kyiv and the violence of non-Russophiles there. against Russian speakers.

But if the violence has persisted on the Ukrainian side, it is also because Russia has never withdrawn its military equipment supporting the Russophile separatists. “Russia had nothing to do with it, it had a simple role of observer, it was up to Ukraine to respect these agreements”, insist Georgy Babayan and Nadana Fridrikhson on the RT set.

The interrogation ends, no one has changed their opinion, but it's always better to talk to each other than to shoot each other, even about a war. And, in any case, despite possible tinkering with the translation (we have no choice but to rely on it), some RT viewers may have heard the word “war” and qualifying Putin as “ international criminal”.

Perhaps I helped make Russian propaganda appear more liberal than people tend to think of it, or perhaps it was all just a carefully orchestrated operation aimed at convince me, the Western journalist, that I could say whatever I wanted in Russia. After all, the European Union has banned RT in Europe and YouTube prevents access to propaganda content. However, the video is accessible on RuTube.ru. In any case, I found it.

Stephen Feltri

https://www.courrierinternational.com/a ... ssia-today

[GuyGadeboisTheBack]

Repression, censorship, website blocking… Is Vladimir Putin’s Russia a dystopia? We asked the question to researcher Françoise Daucé, during the Allez savoir social science festival.

For several years now, Russia has been training to cut off its telecommunications network from the global Internet, conducting large-scale exercises whenever its technical capabilities allow. In 2018, a bill presented to the Russian Parliament even planned to oblige Internet service providers (ISPs) to guarantee the complete independence of the Russian Internet space (Runet).

How to protect yourself in case external powers want to cut off access to the global network? Not only. Because as the trio of researchers Françoise Daucé, Benjamin Loveluck and Francesca Musiani remind us in their book Genesis of digital authoritarianism - Repressions and resistance on the internet in Russia, 2012-2022 (Editions Presses des Mines), the regime of Vladimir Putin leads for several years a long-term battle to control and repress more and more severely the online activities of its population. And isolate it, as much as possible, from the rest of the world's digital activities.

On the occasion of the Allez savoir social science festival, initiated by the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS) in partnership with the city of Marseille (from September 20 to 24), we questioned the sociologist Françoise Daucé on the subject.

Usbek & Rica: Blockages, interruptions, censorship… By browsing the timeline “Internet in Russia, from peace to war (2010–2022)” that you produced as part of the ANR ResisTIC research project, we become aware of the extent of control exercised online by Vladimir Putin's regime. How has the war in Ukraine reinforced this control?

Françoise Daucé
Russia has been deploying a multitude of controls on the Internet for several years and more particularly since 2012, the year when there were major demonstrations against electoral fraud and the re-election of Vladimir Putin. Following these large-scale mobilizations, the Russian government became aware of the role of the Internet and social networks in the organization of collective protest actions. Since 2012, we have seen the deployment of controls and regulation of the Internet which affect very diverse aspects of the digital community, at all scales, whether on the technical, algorithmic or freedom of expression level.

With the start of the war in February 2022, this entire system of control was padlocked. Basically, the war in Ukraine confirms control systems developed over time. But it also constitutes a turning point due to the radical dimension of this control, which is now exercised in the context of a large-scale war. In short, Russia went from an Internet under authoritarian rule to an Internet under war rule.

The Russian state has been training for several years to cut off its telecommunications network from the global Internet. Is this technique a sham or is it part of a real strategy?

Françoise Daucé
The specificity of the Russian Internet is linked in particular to its hybrid character: until 2022, major international Internet players that we know well in the West, such as Google or Facebook, and major national applications coexisted in this same space. , notably the giant Yandex and the social network VKontakte. Since the start of the war, major international platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram have been blocked.
But the regulation of power is more subtle than that. It plays on the dual nature of the Russian Internet to, on the one hand, gradually oust international players; and, on the other hand, regain increasingly firm control over national actors. Yandex, for example, has gone from being a private company to being a company under the direct control of Russian power in just a few years. This double movement allows the latter to maintain a semblance of an autonomous Internet, particularly with regard to GAFAM, without necessarily needing to go through total disconnections for the moment.

“Unlike China, digital authoritarianism in Russia could initially be described as low-tech and low-cost because it did not rely on very advanced automated filtering capabilities,” you explain in your book. What do you mean by that ?

Françoise Daucé
In Russia, the Internet developed very freely in the 1990s, at a time when the state was literally collapsing. This period was very chaotic, to the point that a lot of experimentation was allowed in the digital field. Multiple players such as Internet service providers, but also journalists or computer importers, have been able to carry out all kinds of experiments. Until the end of the 2000s, the digital space was relatively poorly controlled in Russia. Dmitri Medvedev, Russian president from 2008 to 2012, even presented himself as an experienced technophile, acting for the development of digital technology in his country. This fairly free deployment was driven by the idea that the Internet would become an engine of economic development. State control was established quite late, at a time when the Internet was already relatively deregulated in the country.

The Chinese context is quite different: from the beginning of the Internet, the communist power was very interested in the Internet and undertook to regulate it. In China, there has been no collapse or transition to post-communism. It is always the Party that retains control of political power. Control was implemented more consistently, with deployment of specific Chinese applications and early blocking of international services.

Back to the West. As you demonstrate in your book, the development of the Internet in Russia brought, at its beginnings, a form of libertarian utopia “breaking with the Soviet authoritarian heritage”. Can we put this utopia on the same level as that promoted by the Californian pioneers of the American Internet, who were also part of a countercultural approach?

Françoise Daucé
At the end of the Soviet period, there was indeed great interest in cybernetics in Russia. The development of computational tools was a subject that fascinated Soviet engineers. The latter, however, failed to create their own digital network, as researcher Benjamin Peters shows in his book How Not to Network a Nation (MIT Press, 2016), whose story also recalls the way in which the Minitel failed in France.

But what must be understood is that the deployment of the Internet in the 1990s took place in a context of extremely rapid and brutal deregulation, which we would later refer to as "therapy of shock” – the transition from an administered and planned economy to a liberal capitalist economy. The pioneers of the Russian Internet are therefore part of this liberal utopia. They carry within them the hope that economic liberalization will automatically lead to a democratic project. Rather than the hippie utopia of the American pioneers, the Russian pioneers are in a libertarian utopia: no state regulation and freedom to undertake as the watchword.

Are there traces of this story remaining in current Russian culture?

Françoise Daucé
Yes, we see traces of it at multiple levels, even if they tend to fade with the strengthening of the authoritarian governance of the Putin regime. The pioneers themselves, very young at the time, are still alive and have experienced different trajectories. Among the many Russian access providers – currently, there are still more than 3000 Internet access providers in Russia, which is very different from what we know in France – some try to circumvent surveillance systems on fairly local scales. Above all, most of these pioneers gave birth to associations for the defense of digital freedoms, such as Roskomsvoboda (an offshoot of the Russian Pirate Party), OZI (whose main leaders are former telecoms engineers) and Teplitsa, three associations which have been declared “foreign agents” and most of whose members were forced to go into exile. Another example is that of Pavel Durov, this young engineer who founded VKontakte in the 2000s before having to go into exile in 2014 due to the pressures placed on him. He has since co-founded the Telegram app, which has become very popular around the world. His trajectory well illustrates this libertarian heritage: both victim of state control and repression, but always capable of acting from abroad.

Would you go so far as to say that Vladimir Putin's Russia is today a “digital dystopia”, to use the title of your conference?

Françoise Daucé
The idea of ​​digital dystopia can be thought of from the Russian context, but not only. What we have observed since the beginning of the 2010s is a global and growing concern about the dystopian uses of the Internet by a certain number of actors, in particular private actors whose control and surveillance systems are viewed with suspicion.

Conversely, in the Russian and Chinese cases, we observe rather a concern regarding public actors. Today, Internet users in Russia are so worried about the control of the Russian state that they have almost blind trust in private international digital players and therefore in GAFAM, as researchers Olga Bronnikova and Anna Zaytseva in a recent article. It’s a striking paradox to say the least. The Russian case therefore sheds light in a rather singular way on a global contemporary concern, which we can effectively designate through the term “dystopia”.

https://usbeketrica.com/fr/article/la-r ... -de-guerre