I therefore create this subject because it is an interesting study on the Imperial Collge in London: https://www.imperial.ac.uk/ et https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_College_London
This study published on March 16, 2020 concerns effects of different types of containment on the progression of the COVID19 epidemic and its results are worrying ... Without confinement this study predicts up to 60 deaths a day in the USA for a total of 000 million deaths!
To read download here: https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperi ... 3-2020.pdf
Backup:
WHO Collaborating Center for Infectious Disease Modeling
MRC Center for Global Infectious Disease Analysis
Abdul Latif Jameel Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics
Imperial College London
Correspondence: neil.ferguson@imperial.ac.uk
This study is only a mathematical modeling and does not take into account any possible traitement!
It therefore concerns different types of more or less rigorous containment.
Some results are therefore worrying:
- the study already starts with 5 months of confinement (therefore already more than the Chinese confinement of just over 2 months),
- peak reached in the 2nd part of MAY 2020
- possibility of such a serious relapse in December 2020 ... (but there, I did not understand why or how?)
I did not read everything in detail but I extracted the main curves below ... it sucks guys!
Fortunately this is only theory and as the saying goes ...
"If the theory worked all the time in practice it would know!"
Here are the main data ... in your handkerchiefs!
![Shocked : Shock:](https://www.econologie.com/forums/images/smilies/icon_eek.gif)
Summary in Google Translated:
The global impact of COVID-19 has been profound and the public health threat it represents is the most serious observed in a respiratory virus since the H1N1 pandemic of 1918. We present here the results of the epidemiological modeling which informed policy making in the UK and other countries. those last weeks. In the absence of a COVID-19 vaccine, reassessing the potential role of a number of public health measures - so-called non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) - aimed at reducing contact rates in the population and therefore reducing transmission of the virus. In the results presented here, we apply a microsimulation model previously published to two countries: the United Kingdom (in particular Great Britain) and the United States. We conclude that the effectiveness of any intervention in isolation is likely to be limited, requiring the combination of several interventions to have a substantial impact on transmission.
Two basic strategies are possible: (a) mitigation, which focuses on slowing down, but not necessarily stopping the spread of the epidemic - reducing maximum demand for health care while protecting those most at risk at risk of serious illness against infections, and (b) suppression, which aims to reverse epidemic growth, reducing the number of cases to low levels and maintaining this situation indefinitely. Each policy has major challenges. We find that optimal mitigation policies (combining the isolation at home of suspect cases, the quarantine at home of people living in the same household as suspect cases and the social distancing of the elderly and the most vulnerable risk of serious illness) could cut health care demand peak by 2/3 and deaths by half. However, the resulting mitigated epidemic would likely result in hundreds of thousands of deaths and health systems (including intensive care units) repeatedly overwhelmed, which leaves repression as the preferred political option for countries able to achieve it.
We show that in the context of the United Kingdom and the United States, repression will require at least a combination of social distancing from the entire population, home isolation of cases and quarantining of their members. family. This may need to be complemented by school and university closings, but it must be recognized that these closings can have negative impacts on health systems and absenteeism.
The main challenge of law enforcement is that this type of intensive intervention - or something equivalent effective in reducing transmission - will need to be maintained until a vaccine becomes available (potentially 18 months or more) - since we predict that transmission will rebound quickly if interventions are relaxed. show that intermittent social distancing - triggered by trends in disease surveillance - can allow interventions to be temporarily relaxed in relatively short periods of time, but measures will have to be reintroduced if or when the number of cases rebounds. Finally, while experience in China and now in South Korea shows that removal is possible in the short term, it remains to be seen whether this is possible in the long term and whether the social and economic costs of the interventions adopted so far can be reduced.