In the Did67 link:
http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/04/20/alerte-aux-certificats-falsifies-dans-le-nucleaire_4905333_3234.htmlDuring the investigation, SBS, a subsidiary of the Genoyer group, acknowledged the facts. In question, one of his employees, dismissed since. He was in charge of quality control. When the analyzes carried out by Bureau Veritas or Apave showed that the parts were not in conformity, for a too high chromium level for example, it happened to him to transform their reports on his computer, to change some figures, so that the products can to be delivered despite everything without customers giving up. About sixty masked reports were identified.
"This was on minor points," says Ludovic Malgrain, the company's lawyer. When there were important subjects, it did not modify the certificates. "
At this stage of the investigation, it seems that these repeated cheating does not cause any security problem on installations in service.
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This kind of "drift" is common in the nuke, aeronautics, automobile industry, etc. As it happens, precisely when quality control is hierarchically the responsibility of a "production department". The first of the accounts to be made is ... economic (production objective) and not of quality follow-up. The greater the economic stake, the less the conformity decision rests with the inspectors (those who are supposed to apply the applicable inspection procedures and tolerances).
Under pressure (most often hierarchical), the controller is asked to re-check .... until it is good. From there come some "arrangements" with the calibration of measuring instruments, with the corrections resulting from the calibration of the instruments themselves, with the calibration procedure which does not specify everything ....
A) There is "what is done" (very slight exceeding of tolerance), supposed not to be dangerous (tolerance unnecessarily too tight and whose validated experience of long standing confirms the uselessness). ---> without consequence for the product or the whole
B) There is what is out of tolerance (even very little) but whose consequence on the controlled product or together is not controlled. It would be necessary to make tests, test tubes, studies to lift the indeterminacy of behavior of the product or set. But when there is no question of exceeding the costs (quickly huge in some cases) ...... Some (not controllers and not necessarily technically competent) allow themselves to question the tolerances and their calculations provided by the office study, simulations of RDM etc, to deny the experience and or the common sense ..... all this to force the decision of conformity.
For A), the correction is "easy". We work on a consensus between the design office, production and control to widen the tolerance. The "Quality" does its job and everyone can work in the medium term without cheating / providing false documents.
For B), there is no solution to expect from the big financiers who are ready to compromise everyone ... except them. Those who refuse to cheat can easily find themselves in the closet ....
In this nuke case, it would take a lot more evidence to know if what was done was more dangerous than usual. But there is little chance that the details of the “manipulations” will reach the public without filtering and manipulation by the operator and ASN.
