The international community acts as if it had given itself the word to definitively discredit the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We will remember the crisis in North Korea and its withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in 2003, without the United Nations Security Council moving for fear of a Chinese veto. While the international community seems to have learned nothing from this crisis, the lesson has not been lost on everyone. Iran is preparing the ground for following the same path, in the event that the development of its nuclear program is threatened by the Security Council.
In November 2003, in a damning report, the International Nuclear Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed that Iran had pursued a clandestine program of enrichment of uranium by centrifugation for eighteen years, and had concealed a number considerable amount of nuclear facilities, activities and materials in violation of its commitments. This matter should have been seized by the Security Council, as provided for in the statutes of the Agency. It was not for several reasons. Firstly, because several countries have pointed out the absence of "proof that previously undeclared nuclear material and activities have been linked to a nuclear weapons program", even though all are aware that the Agency does not have the means necessary to provide such proof before it is too late.